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The most incredible thing about miracles is that they happen.
—G. K. Chesterton*
PRIOR TO THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
In writing about miracles it is hardly possible not to think first of David Hume.
In many quarters he is remembered as the one who had once and for all divested
miracles of intellectual respectability. Such a reputation is part of the awe in which
Hume as a man of intellect is still held. Yet, as far as intellectual construction goes,
Hume himself admitted that his theory of understanding resembled not so much
an edifice as a heap of bricks.' To his credit he also perceived that his premises
provided only for one kind of glue, plain sentiment or mere habit, to make those
bricks stick together into some sort of intellectual framework. About such an
outcome Hume was both very despondent in his truly philosophical moments and
also very outspoken. Already his first major philosophical work, The Treatise on
Human Nature, contains the unabashed declaration, "Reason is, or ought only to
be, the slave of passions."2 That a leader of the Enlightenment did not rather speak
of the enslavement of passions to reason may tell something of the true nature of
the light generated by that much glorified movement. To be sure, by "passions"
Hume meant a dignified, quiet, urbane comportment, a foremost existential
commodity in his eyes. Indeed all of Hume's philosophy was meant to be a shield
against harsh, disturbing truths, especially the ones that bespeak of man's subordination to transcendental dimensions. He correctly perceived that none of
those dimensions were a potential threat to a tensionless lifestyle if the idea of God
were a matter of mere wishful thinking.
Hume's relentless effort to justify intellectually a Weltanschauung free of
transcendental constraints was in part a reaction to Calvinist tenets, zealously
preached in the Edinburgh of his youth, about God's wrath on those He had
positively predestined to hell. Another source was Hume's own personal make-up
in which Epicurean traits, as amply revealed by his classic portraits, clearly
dominated. Epicurus, who figures prominently in the closing section of Hume's
*The Innocence of Father Brown (1911: Penguin Books, 1950) p. 11.
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Enquiry, was certainly Hume's model in seeking the intellectual grounds for a
peace of mind which consisted in being left alone by the gods. 3
Nothing has, of course, ever been so much a threat to that ideal of splendid
isolation as the One for whom the "Hound of Heaven" is still the psychologically
most expressive name. 4 Awareness of Him has three main sources of which one,
moral consciousness or the sense of the holy, affected Hume little if at all. In a
sense, however civilized, he was a counter image of a Bunyan, a Wesley, let alone of
John Henry Newman. 5 He did not pretend indifference toward the two other
sources, one philosophical, the other historical. This is not to suggest that his style
showed emotional overtones as he went about dissecting the classical proofs of the
existence of God: the cosmological and the teleological. He skillfully played the
role of uninterested bystander intent only on incontrovertible verities. He could
not, however, mask his sarcastic contentment as he completed his picking apart the
cosmological argument with a celebration of the idea of aborted, incoherent,
botched-up universes. 6
That such an outcome was destructive of the notion of universally valid laws did
not seem to bother him. Nor did he seem to be mindful of the fact that years earlier
his attack on miracles 7 assumed the notion of immutable laws of nature. He also
failed to come to grips with the fact that on the basis of the bare inductionism he
advocated one could never establish the existence of such laws. An inductionism
severed from metaphysics could not yield that completeness which was meant by
universally and permanently valid laws. Most importantly, Hume did not offer
satisfactory explanation of the role he accorded in his philosophy to the
recognition'of facts. As far as he was a sensationist or empiricist philosopher he
had to grant equal credibility to the recognition of any fact, usual or unusual. That
recognition had to be certain, if the philosophy built on it was to give assurance of
certainty. But as far as he was a genuinely Humean philosopher, who subordinated
reason to sentiments, he had to part with his professed impartiality vis-à-vis any
kind of fact, usual or unusual. But partiality for some facts, which meant distrust
for others, invited uncertainty about all facts. This is why when arguing against
miracles Hume switched grounds. 8 From a mere probability argument against
miracles (the trustworthy witnessing of regular recurrences far outweighed that of
exceptional events) he went on dismissing entirely the credibility of witnesses
(whatever their number, learnedness, and integrity) on behalf of exceptional or
"miraculous" events. Behind such a tactical shift there had to be a fundamental
consideration at play. Hume gave a glimpse of it as in the same context he declared,
"If the spirit of religion join itself to the love of wonder, there is an end of common
sense."9 Hume's philosophy in general and his arguments against miracles in
particular, are pivoted on the meaning he gave to common sense.
In Hume's century common sense had many champions, the first of them being
the Jesuit Claude Buffier, today almost completely forgotten. They all believed
that common sense was the best assurance for certainty about the existence of
external reality, that is, of objective facts, things, and events. ) 0 That Father
Bailer's contention had no less an admirer than Voltaire," was not without a
common though least noted instructiveness. The praises of an unsound philosophe
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were not the clue toward the best philosophical meaning which an expression, be it
common sense, was susceptible of. Insofar as it became equated with mere
common opinion, it certainly had no chance in securing, and certainly not among
philosophers, a certainty about the reality of objective facts. That a commonly
shared opinion is a most variable commodity was implied in the phrase, "climate of
opinion," made popular early in this century by Whitehead, who borrowed it from
a "seventeenth-century writer" (Joseph Glanvill) without naming him. 12
A recall of the times which witnessed the coining of that phrase should not
appear useless for Christian theologians. They all, of course, know that defense of
miracles has from those times on been an increasingly uphill battle against the
climate of opinion taken for common sense. But perhaps not all of them are aware
of the unsoundness of a defense of miracles that seeks an ally in the successive
climates of opinion, philosophical and scientific. As will be clear later, the present
status of that defense provides much for a new chapter in a now old story. That
there will be no end to it may be surmised by those mindful of a biblical phrase with
a sceptical touch, "There is nothing new under the sun" (Ecclesiastes 1:9). In respect
to controversies about miracles, history turns out to be once more the past written
in that present tense in which grammarians have long ago recognized the
beckoning of the future.
But there is an additional reason in a paper on miracles and science to go back to
the past in order to understand the present and be prepared at least for the
immediate future. The reason relates to the measure to which science contributed
to the formation of climate of thought--as difficult to escape as the air one
breathes-:ever since the days of Glanvill. Those days saw the rise of Newtonian
science with all its dazzling successes that opened unsuspected vistas in man's
understanding of nature. No less dazzling, though in an opposite or blinding sense,
were some philosophical presuppositions grafted on that science by men of science,
Newton included, dabbling in philosophy, and by philosophers with little if any
expertise in science.
The chief and strictly scientific lure in that dubious game was the inverse square
law. Had the seventeenth century not been the age of scientific genius, it might have
witnessed serious interest in its own immediate intellectual past. As that past was in
good part a matter of printed record, disregard for it could not be excused with a
reference to the difficulty of gathering manuscript material, a task difficult even in
this age of instant copies and tele-copying. Even a cursory reading of the printed
record in question, say of the works of Kepler, Horrocks, and Hooke, would have
shown that the inverse square law was not a generalized statement derived from
individual observations or experiments. Such an interpretation of the provenance
of the inverse square law would have fitted only the empiricist-inductionist straitjacket tailored by Bacon for science as its foolproof method. For that garment,
which only some foolhardy amateurs cared to don, no scientific genius of the
century of genius had any use. Certainly not Newton. But Newton was also a
genius in that he was most unwilling to credit other geniuses. Because of his
jealousy of Hooke, Newton did not give enough credit to Hooke's ideas on the
inverse square law of gravitation. 13 To anyone familiar with Leibniz's work,
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equally suspect would appear Newton's claims about his having been the sole
discoverer of infinitesimal calculus.
Newton certainly belied his own overbearing self-centeredness when he voiced a
twelfth-century statement (resurrected in the seventeenth-century debate concerning old and new learning) that the moderns saw farther because they were sitting on
the shoulders of giant forebears. 14 Newton certainly had such a giant to help him
see the inverse square law loom large on his mental horizon. The giant was none
other than Kepler whose three laws of planetary motion were mediated to Newton
through a little-appreciated mid-seventeenth-century English astronomer, Jeremiah Horrocks. Those three laws and Huygens' law of centrifugal force could
easily be combined in such a way as to yield the inverse square law.
Whether Newton had performed early enough that elementary algebraic
operation is disputed. 15 But he did not need to do so in order to convince himself
about the validity of the inverse square law. As one with keen interest in optics,
Newton was certainly familiar with Kepler's explicit statements on the decrease of
light intensity with the square of distance from a point source. 16 Nor could Newton
be ignorant of the fact that Kepler's own certainty about that law of optics was not
based at all on observations. Reliable photometry was still two centuries away.
Kepler's certainty rested on an a priori philosophical assumption about nature.
According to that assumption space was homogeneous. The spreading of any
physical effect—optical, thermal or gravitational—in such a space could only follow
the inverse square law. Those aware of the influence of the Cambridge Neoplatonists on young Newton, with their markedly a priori speculations, and of old
Newton's divinization of homogeneous Euclidean space as God's sensorium," will
easily perceive the irresistible attractiveness which Kepler's train of thought had to
have on Newton. The latter had been fully convinced about the inverse square law
of gravitation long before he compared the fall of the moon in its orbit with the fall
of an object on the earth and before he had elegantly derived that law from the
notion of a central field of force.
The first important thing to note here is the a priori certainty as the source of
Newtonian science pivoted on the inverse square law of gravitation. This source
was duly and quickly overlooked as Newtonian science proved ever more
successful, but it did not fail to act less potently. Newton could lull himself into
believing that he was really a "Newtonian" natural philosopher, starting from facts,
experiments, and observations and never from hypotheses or postulates. Few
leading men of science have ever indulged in so many a priori hypotheses as the one
who boasted: hypotheses non fingo. 18
These historical details about seventeenth-century science will reveal their
bearing on our topic as soon as one notes the second important point. It is implied
in the first about the certainty felt on a priori grounds about the inverse square law.
This chief and spectacularly fruitful law of Newtonian science could easily create a
most portentous illusion about the status of the laws of nature. Was it not tempting
to assume that the laws of nature were not only accessible to the human mind on an
a priori basis but were also ontologically necessary in the form in which they were
unveiled by a priori reasoning? And, if such was the case, could there be any real
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need for experimentation? More importantly, could there be any need for a
Creator if nature necessarily had to be what it appeared to be through that very
same a priori reasoning?
Such questions about science as well as natural theology could hardly be
answered in a clear-cut way in the seventeenth century, a transition from Christian
to secularized thought. Ambivalence, hesitation, and confusion about these
questions were everywhere in the utterances of Galileo, Descartes, Newton, to say
nothing of lesser figures with quite a few divines among them, eager to explore the
new science for the purposes of theology. 19 As to science, the potential pitfalls were
in full evidence when Galileo slighted Kepler's discovery of the elliptical orbits of
planets. He did so on the patently a priori ground that the heavenly motions had to
be perfectly circular, a position which allied Galileo with Aristotle, the cosmologistscientist, whom he wanted to vanquish above al1. 20 Descartes could never warm up
to the indispensability of experiments. 21 Had Newton not been the scientific genius
he was, his philosophical a priorism (with strong Cartesian touches) would have
weakened his attention to observational evidence on more than a few occasions. 22
Hewasnotivleryspcfqutionadbyhevc.Ift
latter was the ultimate truth about the law of nature, what was the true heuristic
value of the a priori approach?
This question might have been definitively answered in the seventeenth century
had its scientific geniuses not represented a transition between Christian and
secular thought. The minds of Galileo, Descartes, and Newton were not
sufficiently Christian to perceive the pseudo-deity (be it pantheism or materialism
or deism) lurking behind a priori thinking. They were, however, sufficiently
Christian to give no serious consideration to a world without a Creator. Belief in
creation thoroughly conditioned their minds to think of nature as suffused by
reason and law even in that sublunary realm which was a realm of disorder for
pagan minds such as Plato and Aristotle, whatever their intention to celebrate
cosmic rationality. But if one was to consider in all its consequences the denial of
an infinitely rational Creator, could the inference be avoided that in such a case no
rationality whatever could appear in nature?
This inference was not broadly recognized even when in the nineteenth century
the secularization of Western thought began to unfold its full logic. Even such a
master logician as John Stuart Mill failed to recognize the full implications of his
own speculation about other worlds where two and two would not necessarily
make four. 23 For in that case there beckoned the specter of absolute contingentism
against which Mill's 'god' (half good, half evil) was hardly a logical shield. Mill was,
however, logical to the point of admitting that Hume's notion of the invariability
of nature's laws as a refutation of miracles rested on the presupposition that God
does not exist. For as Mill put it, a "miracle is a new effect supposed to be produced
by the introduction of new cause...; of the adequacy of that cause, if present, there
can be no doubt." 24 Even less recognition was given during the nineteenth century
to the fact that absolute contingentism was but a replay of the occasionalism
advocated by al-Ashari and Ockham.
At any rate, was the order of nature provided by absolute contingentism or
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occasionalism different from that radical form of positivism according to which
the laws of nature are mere commodious devices created by the mind for its own
convenience to deal with facts? 25 Scientists, who endorsed that theory, did not do
so to the logical extent of advocating a closure of laboratories. But this conflict of
their theory with their practice provided no answer to the question as to why there
was order in nature, that is, why nature obeyed specific laws. Refusal to anchor
that order in the Creator could but leave one with the fearful prospect of a radically
random state of affairs. There stones would not regularly fall, but just as likely
hang in mid-air or take off unexpectedly in any direction. There it would be most
unlikely that the hatching of a chicken egg would yield a chick. There a flower
would perpetuate its own kind only as an exceptional case. In other words, in a
world severed from its Creator, lawfulness would be the miracle, that is, a most
unexpected event.
The foregoing examples are a mere paraphrase of the most incisive pages written
on the laws of nature. The time, 1908, was the high water mark of the worst
misrepresentation of science once cast in the mold of scientistic ideology. The
book, not surprisingly, had Orthodoxy for its title. Its author, Gilbert Keith
Chesterton, was not a scientist, not even a philosopher of science. 26 But he was
certainly a thinker most independent of the climate of thought of his time if there
ever was such a thinker. No such independence was evident in the geniuses of the
seventeenth century, with Pascal being a major exception. A famous remark of his
portrayed Descartes as the one who really had no need of God. 27 Pascal could have
just as well stated the same about Galileo, who could exalt the human mind and
debase the divine mind in the same breath. As he stated that the human mind was
the greatest marvel of creation, Galileo also equated human knowledge of
geometry with that of the Creator. 28 From there it was but a step to deriving
nature's geometrical structure from the mind. Such a nature soon was seen to be in
no need either of mind or of God. The perception was achieved just a decade or so
before science came of age through Newton's Principia. In that perception of
Spinoza, nature and God were made identical which simply excluded the
possibility of miracles. 29 Much less noted was the most devastating consequence of
the Spinozian position. It consisted in Spinoza's thorough perplexity about the
existence of concrete, specific, limited things making up nature and providing
science with its subject matter. 30
To be sure, few at that time, and certainly not the scientists, became Spinozians.
But whereas there was no pressing need for following Spinoza, the question of
miracles pressed itself on in the measure in which the laws of nature began to
appear as subtly ultimate entities. Undoubtedly, Newton was sincere as he assigned
to God's direct action certain arrangements in the physical realm for which his
science contained no answer. One such arrangement was, according to Newton,
the separation of fiery from cold matter, or the separation of celestial bodies into
stars and planets. 31 His other example, the periodic intervention of God to secure
the stability of the solar system, made a better known intellectual history through
Laplace's scientific solution to that problem. 32 It was the history of holes in which
divines, ready to jump on the bandwagon of science without seriously studying it
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and unwilling to probe an essentially philosophical question to its very bottom,
were eagerly locating Almighty God as one busy doing what science could not do.
Many divines, in fact, lost their faith in miracles as they saw those holes being
filled up with the relentless progress of science. They turned to an increasingly
radical reinterpretation of biblical miracles culminating in the exegesis of
Bultmann and in the philosophy of Ernst Bloch. 33 They might have saved
themselves from this intellectual and spiritual debacle had they pondered Newton's
own position vis-a-vis miracles. Newton's unwillingness to admit the reality of
biblical miracles never cut ice with unbelievers. It was quite possibly a tactic on
Newton's part to cover up his Unitarianism, which, if discovered, would have cost
him the Lucasian chair in Cambridge and, later, the Directorship of the Mint.
Unbelievers could, of course, be but reassured by Newton's categorical denial of
Christian miracles postdating New Testament times. 34 Clearly, Newton believed
less in Christianity than he should have and believed more than a Christian should
in the laws of science and nature. One wonders whether Newton had ever as much
as suspected the miracle of creation in the beginning that lurked behind each and
every law of nature, or the miracle of a nature stable in its orderliness. For only
with an eye on that miracle can the possibility of miracle be raised meaningfully.
The miracle of creation in the beginning implies, of course, the Creator's
sovereign freedom to create or not to create. No less importantly, his creative
freedom is divine also in the sense that the actual universality of things created by
him is only one of an infinite number of possibilities at His disposal. Such a
Creator is not contradicting the rationality and consistency of His creation if it
includes an intellectual and moral realm which the physical realm is to support and
serve. With such a notion, and only with such a notion of Creator and creation in
focus, it was natural to say, as did George G. Stokes, a prominent physicist of the
late nineteenth-century, "Admit the existence of a God, of a personal God, and the
possibility of miracle follows at once." 35 The contrast could not have been greater
with Voltaire's often quoted utterance that "to suppose that God will work
miracles is to insult Him with impunity." 36 The ground for that insult was,
according to Voltaire, that a miracle meant the inability on God's part to
accomplish any particular end by immutable laws. The fallacy of Voltaire's
reasoning lay in his own inability to see in the realm of existence anything but a
mere clockwork in which there was no room for free beings. Of human freedom, a
most immediately evident factual experience, he could speak only with the gravest
perplexity. 37
Voltaire was not the first or last worshiper of the laws of nature for whom the
freedom of the will was a source of continual nightmare. One wonders what
latter-day Voltaires felt on hearing no less a physicist than Arthur H. Compton
declare that the evidence on behalf of man's conviction to move his little finger at
will was immensely greater than all the evidence on behalf of Newton's laws. From
this it followed, according to Compton, that should a conflict arise between our
sense of freedom and Newton's physics, it is the latter that needed to be revised. 38
Recognitfma'srden,ofcusthrginofamlder
which alone is to be served by miracles. That they were never for entertaining the
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curious was called to the attention of the Pharisees and Sadducees of all ages by
none other than the greatest miracle worker of all times, Jesus of Nazareth. 39
In 1934, when Compton spoke, Newtonian physics had for some time been
superseded. The mathematical tools of the new physics—quantum mechanics—
were statistical. They were very different, nay irreducible to pure differential
equations, which are the backbone of Newtonian physics. Those equations are all
translatable into geometry in which the lines or curves representing various
parameters are always continuous. (It may be worth recalling that the Principia's
mathematics were invariably given in geometrical figures equivalent to what later
became known as differential geometry.) The geometrical continuity implied, in
principle at least, the possibility of measuring with perfect accuracy the physical
processes described by those figures. It was at that point that an elementary error in
reasoning gained currency among physicists who were then readily echoed by
philosophers overawed by the success of a field they did not really know. The
possibility of perfectly accurate measurements became quickly taken as the justification of ontological causality in physical interactions. The inference was
equivalent to putting the cart before the horse. Worse, that mistaken philosophical
maneuver began to function as the exact foundation of the ideology of immutable
laws of nature, of absolute physical determinism, and of the absurdity of miracles.
Spokesmen of that ideology were a dime a dozen. Ironically, their selfconfidence and public acceptance reached its peak just in the decades when the
handwriting became increasingly visible on the superb edifice of Newtonian
physics. The decades were the ones saddling the turn of the century. 40 The
moderately comforting aspect of that intellectual debacle was that some prominent
men of science had not lent their voice to a chorus wholly out of tune with science.
Henri Poincare, the foremost mathematical physicist of the time, had for all his
agnosticism the presence of mind to warn that "it is with freedom that one
demonstrates complete determinism." 41 Philosophers and divines lacking that
modicum of common sense were all too numerous. Thus E. Goblot, professor of
logic at the Sorbonne, wrote "All induction rests on the confidence we have in
determinism. There is therefore in nature neither contingency nor caprice, nor
miracle, nor free will; any of these hypotheses ruin our mental ability to reason
about things."42 The only logical merit in that statement was the juxtaposition of
miracles and free will. A most glaring fault from the logical viewpoint was Goblot's
reference to confidence, hardly a matter for rigorous logic. Last but not least, was
Goblot entitled to praise—and to royalties—for his book if in terms of his
declaration it was a necessary result of his brain mechanism, or more rudely, of his
nourishment and lodgings?
Unintended instructiveness is no less glaring in the declaration of the
philosopher of religion, A. Sabatier, "Miracles have no basis in modern
philosophy. The method inaugurated by Galileo, Bacon and Descartes gives to our
thinking a turn which necessarily excludes it." 43 Such a turn could come about only
through a very selective reading of those three and of others with whose names
Newtonian science became synonymous. Whatever the inadequacies of their dicta
on scientific method, those three certainly wanted no part in an ideology restricted
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to matter and motion. They would have undoubtedly rejected the declaration of G.
Seailles, a chief late-nineteenth-century spokesman of empiricist and scientistic
secularism, "By its principles as well as by its conclusions science excludes
miracles."" The empiricist Bacon's dismissal of miracles as means never used by
God "to convert the heathen," was still balanced by his emphasis on the evidence
which an orderly nature brings to its Creator, 45 a position unacceptable to Seailles
and his cohorts among empiricists. Seailles could hardly be ignorant of Descartes'
often quoted dictum "God performed three miracles: the creation of things out of
nothing, the freedom of the will, and the Incarnation." 46 The point, which the
scientistic antagonists of miracles might have most profited from and which they
would have most resented, was also already made in Descartes' century and by no
less a scientist than Leibnitz: "If geometry were as much opposed to our passions
and present interests as is ethics, we would contest it and violate it but little less
notwithstanding the demonstrations of Euclid." 47 The pseudointellectual's sneering at miracles grew into a crescendo in the decades straddling the turn of the
century when Christian morals, private and public, which Christian miracles were
to support above all, became for the first time a major target of secularism.
IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
But to return to physics, or rather to the momentous turn it took about that
time. Of the two new branches of physics representing that turn, one, the theory of
relativity, offered no direct handle on the question of miracles. It has, however, an
important indirect bearing on it which is worth recalling in a few words and all the
more so because it is generally overlooked or simply ignored when set forth. The
theory of relativity was born out of young Einstein's awe for the intellectual beauty
of Maxwell's equations. 48 Since beauty is inseparable from form, it was all too
natural for him to be concerned about the distortion of the simple form of those
equations as they applied to a reference system moving with respect to the
observer. Einstein's great insight consisted in perceiving that the transformation of
those equations from one reference system to another would leave intact their form
provided the speed of light is taken for something absolute, independent even of
the speed of its source. A quick recall of the fact that the speed of sound is never
independent of the motion of its source may help one realize the enormity of the
departure which the Einsteinian postulate of the absoluteness of the speed of light
represents with respect to Newtonian physics. In the latter, which is rightly spoken
of as mechanistic physics, the speed of the propagation of any mechanical or
physical effect is always a function of the speed of its source. That Einsteinian
relativity is based on the unconditionally absolute value of the speed of light may
also help one perceive the measure of skullduggery whereby the relativization of all
ethical and social values is asserted on the basis of Einstein's relativistic physics.
The latter is the most absolutist physical theory ever proposed. 49
The foregoing considerations relate to the theory of special relativity which, with
its uniformly moving reference systems, is a particular case of the theory of general
relativity. The latter deals with accelerated frames of reference. Since the most
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obvious case of acceleration is gravitational motion, it was almost a foregone
conclusion that Einstein should make an effort to deal with the gravitational
interaction of all matter. He did so as he presented in 1917 the last of his memoirs
on general relativity. That memoir was a great first in physics in that it contained
the first, contradiction-free scientific account of a gravitational universe. 50 The
importance of this can easily be seen with a recall of the point on which Kant
staked his critique of the cosmological argument. The point was that science (the
science of Kant's time as he poorly knew it) provided no contradiction-free account
of the universe. This is why Kant felt entitled to call the notion of the universe a
bastard product of the metaphysical cravings of the intellect and, therefore,
unsuitable to serve as the final and crucial jumping board in the intellectual
recognition of the existence of the Creator. 51 This objection of Kant continues to
command credibility only on the part of those unmindful of Einstein's achievement. The latter should, however, loom large in the eyes of those hopeful about a
genuine harmony between science and miracles. The latter can rationally be
discoursed about only if the existence of the Creator and of a moral order
(inconceivable without Him) are assumed. Einstein's contribution to the scientific
grasp of the universe should seem therefore of greatest importance. In fact he
perceived late in his life that his cosmology may be an unintended pointer to the
One beyond the totality of consistently interacting things which is the universe. 52
While the indirect support which the theory of relativity brings to miracles
remains unexploited, quite a vast literature has arisen about the alleged support
which the other main branch of modern physics, quantum theory, allegedly has for
miracles. 53 That literature certainly proves the naivete with which theologians try
to cash in on science even when they are not properly trained in it, or appraise it
with false philosophical premises. They still have to learn that a wrong starting
point can only lead to blind alleys regardless of the subject, be it as lofty as theology
or as down-to-earth as physics. In following up philosophical blind alleys
theologians have no excuse just because prominent scientists give them the lead.
Theologians staking their fate and fortunes on the divinity of the Logos, which
alone makes Christian miracles reasonable and meaningful, should view most
seriously any misstep in logic, in particular, and philosophy in general. It should
seem most un-Christian to espouse mental somersaults or plain verbal tricks that
abound in the literature of the philosophy of quantum mechanics as well as of the
demythologization of miracles. 54
As to the philosophy of quantum mechanics, the pattern for somersaulting was
provided by none other than Heisenberg, one of the architects of quantum
mechanics and the first to unfold a principal consequence of it. Since its
formulation in 1927 that consequence has made intellectual history (not
necessarily coextensive with the history of truth) under the label of the principle of
indeterminacy or uncertainty principle. A much less misleading label would have
been the principle of imprecision. For what Heisenberg found was simply that
measurements of physical interactions involving conjugate variables, such as
momentum and position, time and energy, will always contain a margin of
imprecision, which can be significant on the atomic level. (On the level of ordinary
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perception or macroscopic level, the quantum mechanical imprecision can be
safely ignored because it is many magnitudes smaller than the probable error
acceptable for laboratory or industrial practice on that level.) Heisenberg,
however, jumped to the conclusion that because of the significance of inevitably
imprecise measurements on the atomic level, the principle of causality should be
considered as overthrown. 55
This inference, a sheer non sequitur, was not without an important though often
overlooked merit. If, indeed, the imprecision in question meant the overthrow of
causality, the latter could not be salvaged on the ground that the imprecision in
question is wholly negligible on the macroscopic level of ordinary existence and
operations. The absence of the ontological factor, causality, in the foundations
cannot issue in its presence in a superstructure which is their extension. At any rate,
was Heisenberg right in claiming that there was no causality because of the
inevitable imprecision of measurements of physical interactions? That question
should have been answered in the negative. Instead, it was given an affirmative
answer and to the extent as to become a climate of thought. 56 It was largely
overlooked that Heisenberg's principle states only the inevitable imprecision of
measurements on the atomic level. From that principle one can proceed only by an
elementary disregard of logic to the inference that an interaction that cannot be
measured exactly, cannot take place exactly. 57 The fallacy of that inference consists
in the two different meanings given in it to the word exactly. In the first case it has a
purely operational meaning, whereas in the second case the meaning is decidedly
ontological. The inference therefore belongs in the class of plain non sequiturs that,
as a rule, are severely strictured in better-grade courses on introductory logic.
The alleged demise of ontological causality should have called for a general
sounding of alarms. For that demise could mean but the opening of a chaotic abyss
with neither a bottom nor with safe perimeters limiting its extent. A recognition of
this, coupled with a consistent attention to it, could not be expected either on the
part of prominent physicists or on the part of those in excessive awe of their mental
prowess. Einstein's admission that the man of science is a poor philosopher has
much more to it than meets the eye. He himself failed to suspect this as he lead a
very small group of physicists who refused to accept the counter-casual twist which
Heisenberg gave to his principle and which later became the cornerstone of the
Copenhagen philosophy of quantum mechanics with Niels Bohr and Max Born as
its chief articulators. Einstein never came to realize fully that his disagreement with
those two was not so much about causality, which he too equated with the
possibility of perfectly precise measurements, 58 but with the ontology implied in
causality, physical or other. It was left for W. Pauli, another prominent physicist,
to call to this point the attention of Born who grew as much dismayed by his
inability to convince Einstein as by the cooling of Einstein's feelings toward him.
But Born could hardly desire much enlightenment from Pauli's scornful remark
that Einstein's concern for physical reality was not worth more than the medievals'
debate about the number of angels that could be accommodated on a pinhead. 59
The inability to articulate the question of ontology underlying the debate on the
status of causality in the perspective of quantum mechanics took monumental
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proportion in some lengthy essays of Planck on causality, world order, and
freedom. 6° Ontology and the consequent distinction of it from the merely
operational level could hardly emerge on the mental horizon of Planck, a
professed Neo-Kantian. For him causality was a mental category which did not
depend at all on the observation of the external world. Within the iron grip of that
category were, according to Planck, all events, including all mental operations,
even those of the greatest geniuses. Consequently the freedom of the will as a
mental decision could be but a practical convenience resulting from the fact that
our introspection did not permit a fully objective, that is, completely accurate
evaluation of our motivations. It was that practical impossibility that, according to
Planck, made even Laplace's superior spirit a free agent. As to the Supreme
Wisdom or God, Planck refused to discuss whether He too was free only in that
practical sense, or whether He was not free at all because His nature implied a
perfectly accurate introspection.
The word accurate is worth noting because the possibility of accurate, that is,
quantitatively exact measurements was an integral part of Planck's notion of
causality. He borrowed it from the physicists' world in which he lived and worked.
There the notion of causality had been as widely based on the notion of exact
measurements prior to the advent of quantum mechanics as was the denial of
causality following the overthrow by quantum mechanics of their practical
possibility. In a broader cultural consciousness the foregoing shift appeared as a
departure from a deterministic notion of nature to a non-deterministic one. The
inference that thereby belief in the freedom of the will received a scientific approval
was quickly made, and by no less a scientist than Eddington. 61 Much less attention
was given to his reconsideration of the matter, a few years later, in 1939 to be
specific, when he declared that his earlier arguments on behalf of the freedom of
the will on the basis of the uncertainty principle were wholly mistaken. 62
Refrncstoaw"iflyprovedachtfomewil
kept popping up in the philosophical and theological literature, a story that may be
worthy of detailed documentation. Philosophers and theologians may not be less
inclined to learn from the errors of the past than are politicians and scientists.
That the origins of scientifically-coated rescue operations on behalf of the
freedom of the will antedate the advent of quantum mechanics shows that
theologians can be quite naive in trying to cash in on some glittering straws in the
wind. The simile may seem all the more appropriate because it relates to the
development of statistical methods in gas theory during the closing decades of the
nineteenth century. That this development was often appraised well outside
theological circles as a departure from the deterministic world view is, of course,
true, but this is not necessarily a guarantee of reliability. As a matter of fact, the
statistical gas theory was based on a strictly deterministic application of the
Newtonian laws of motion about the collision of gas molecules taken for perfectly
elastic and spherical bodies. In such a situation the initial conditions determine
with complete accuracy any subsequent state, however far removed from the initial
state. A rigorous interpretation of gas theory did not therefore justify the inference
that most out-of-the-ordinary configurations were only most improbable but not

Miracles and Physics

17

inherently impossible. They were impossible in the measure in which the initial
conditions were ordinary or fairly symmetrical configurations or not. When some
early twentieth-century defenders of miracles reported that "the old rigid system of
the laws of nature is being broken up by modern science," 63 they were very far from
reliable scientific grounds which are always very different from current fashionable
appraisals of the latest in science. The same is true of some scientists who tried to
discredit miracles by calculating the enormous improbabilities of deviations from
the ordinary course of nature. The figure 10 1010 given by J. Perrin, a French
Nobel-laureate physicist, to illustrate the improbability of a tile to deviate from its
vertical fal1, 64 may impress even the layman by its being incomparably larger than
all the atoms in the universe and all the microseconds that have elapsed since its
expansion got under way sixteen billion years ago.
The super-astronomical improbability of this happening does, however, in no
way weaken the certainty of that outcome provided the initial conditions are in
exact conformity with it. But about those initial conditions the scientist could only
admit his ignorance, although he should have kept in mind that it was that very
ignorance that prompted him to calculate mere averages. Since the latter were
useful only for the gaseous state, in which the motion of molecules is extremely
restricted, the application to miracles was in fact tantamount to specious blowing
of mere hot air, worthy only of less than average intellects.
The grafting of scientific respectability on miracles had a far greater appeal with
the advent of quantum mechanics as it was taken to be equivalent to the
breakdown.of strict physical determinism. Here again a detailed account of what
actually happened is still to be written. That there was an early rush of divines to a
terrain which, as it will be clear later, was a ground where angels would have feared
to tread, may be gathered from a book of Bernhard Bavink, published in 1933 and
immediately translated from German into English under the title, Science and
God. 65 The book was the substance of lectures which Bavink had given in various
parts of Germany on science and religion. A graduate of the University of
GOttingen, where he majored in physics, Bavink had a deep interest in theological
questions. This was almost natural on the part of one who had among his paternal
forebears Dutch Mennonites and was converted to Lutheranism by his wife, the
daughter of a pastor. By the early 1930s Bavink had for some years been looked
upon as a leading Christian interpreter of the relation between science and religion.
This was due to the half a dozen editions, between 1913 and 1929, of his magnum
opus that appeared in English translation in 1932 under the title, The Anatomy of
Modern Science. 66 That miracles and science are not discussed in those editions
(and in that translation) is an indication of the fresh interest created in that topic by
the uncertainty principle, still a novelty around 1930 or so.
In recalling Perrin's calculation of the enormous improbability of a macroscopic
object, such as a tile, from deviating randomly from its vertical fall, Bavink noted
that miracles, such as Peter's walking on the water, were macroscopic events where
the laws of classical mechanics were, with their strict determinism, invariably valid.
Such was the immediate background for Bavink's warning, "The theological world
cannot be too strongly warned against attempting to make capital in this way of
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the new discoveries." 67
By new discoveries Bavink meant those aspects of modern physics according to
which the microscopic or atomic level was ruled by chance alone. That chance
meant for Bavink the absence of physical causality, and not merely our ignorance
of causes, was suggested by his admission that a world steeped in the haphazard
may seem much less in keeping with the traditional Christian view of the world as
thoroughly ordered. Would a world of chance evoke, Bavink raised his typically
German question, the recognition of the Creator in the same way in which the
starry realm bespoke to Kant of a cosmic lawgiver? Bavink answered this question
in the affirmative. His reason was that, after all, nothing happens or exists unless
God directly brings it about. This meant, in Bavink's resolution of the theological
question raised by Heisenberg's uncertainty principle, that the difference between
classical physics and the physics of quantum mechanics was very simple. Within
the former God created the original initial conditions in the Beginning; in the latter
God keeps creating the initial conditions at every instant and for all events:
In the literal sense, not a single quantum of action exists in the world
which does not proceed directly and immediately from God. No
natural law, not even a statistical one, compels its existence. Such a
notion is just as meaningless as if we were to imagine that the statistics
of railway accidents or marriages made one year compel those
accidents or marriages taking place the next year, to occur. I think that
the enormous liberation which this insight brings to religious thought
makes it worth while to accept the apparent chance which it requires.
For in truth, believers have always hitherto regarded chance as God's
direct will (Matthew x. 29). This now becomes an evident fact for the
chance in the final elementary actions of existence is nothing other
than the completely free decision by God. 68
None of this should have surprised anyone who had carefully read the first line
of the paragraph out of which this passage has been taken. There Bavink endorsed
the "nominalist protests" against classical physics and against the inference that it
was enough for the regular sequence of physical processes that their initial
conditions be provided by God. That protest seemed to Bavink so well founded as
to dispense of the need for going into "any great philosophical trouble of getting rid
of objections to it." 69 It was, of course, another matter whether it was unreasonable
to assume that God was capable of creating a physical realm with stable laws which
He did not have to re-create at every moment but only had to conserve in its
existence. This age-old Christian distinction between the erstwhile creation of
things out of nothing and the conservation of the existence of things already
created did not arise on Bavink's mental horizon. His claim that in the viewpoint
endorsed by him chance was only apparent, rested on a theology harking back to
Ockham who sought answer in miraculous interventions by God at every moment
to essentially philosophical questions. That theology was eager in resorting to
biblical phrases, such as the one (Matthew 10:21) invoked by Bavink about
sparrows none of which falls to the ground without the Heavenly Father's willing
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it. The fact that in many biblical passages the world is spoken of as firmly
established and that even the endurance of God's covenant is asserted in terms of
the endurance, stability, and unfailing regularity of his physical creation, 70 did not
seem to have any relevance for Bavink.
The problems--scientific, philosophical, and theological--that transpire from the
few pages Bavink devoted to miracles reappear in one way or another in all the
subsequent discussions of miracles with an eye on modern physics. That the
remaining pages will be mostly concerned with two books entirely devoted to
miracles and modern physics is in part due to their wide availability to English
readership. Another reason is that their respective authors are both professional
physicists. One of them, William G. Pollard, is also an Anglican clergyman. The
other, Donald M. MacKay, showed more than a passing interest in matters
theological. Most importantly, their discussions are detailed and therefore provide
their instructiveness in their own terms.
Pollard would have done better justice to his book had he called it not Chance
and Providence but "chance is providence" or, perhaps, "chance is your providence," though not "Providence is your chance." This is not to suggest that by
Providence he did not mean most emphatically the one portrayed in the Bible. By
chance he meant the randomness associated with quantum mechanics. He called it
the "very task" or "primary thesis" of his book to show the full harmony of these
two viewpoints. 72 It should therefore be no surprise that for Pollard quantum
mechanics is the last word in physics. Conclusive for him had to be the failures,
rather numerous by the mid-1950s, of efforts aimed at constructing a quantum
mechanics with hidden variables, that is, a quantum mechanics which would rest
on a mathematical formalism allowing for absolute precise measurements in
principle at least. He undoubtedly found further proof of the statistical character
of scientific explanation when in the mid-1960s J. S. Bell set forth his famous
theorem on the impossibility of hidden variable theories. Pollard may have derived
further assurance when the early 1980s witnessed the completion of experiments
verifying some consequences of Bell's theorem. 73 Yet, no such theorem or
experiments would ever dispose of the question whether an operational restriction
on the precision of measurements is equivalent to an ontological incompleteness of
the interactions to be measured. To anyone, such as Pollard, not facing up to this
question, it is natural to state, as he does, that "the world is so constituted that the
ultimate as well as present characteristic mode of scientific explanation in all fields
is statistical." 74 (Italics added.)
Of the three words italicized (above) the first clearly carries an ontological
meaning. Furthermore, if that meaning is valid, and only then, that is, if the world
really embodies a basic randomness, the use of the two other italicized words is
unobjectionable. To Pollard's credit, he is very conscious both of that logical
connection and of the burden of proof it entails. "In order to establish my primary
thesis that this is a necessary characteristic of scientific knowledge dictated by the
nature of things rather than a merely temporary result of inadequate information,
it is clearly necessary for us to probe much deeper than we have so far."
Unfortunately, he does not fathom philosophical depths. In the same breath, and
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elsewhere too, he reasserts the fundamental ontological status of chance in the
actual world "in which indeterminacy, alternative, and chance are real aspects of
the fundamental nature of things, and not merely the consequence of our
inadequate and provisional understanding."
Ironically, this statement of Pollard is preceded by his dismissal of Einstein's
disagreement with the celebration of chance on the basis of quantum mechanics.
Pollard does so with the characterization of that disagreement as a "philosophical
conviction." Philosophy fares indeed poorly in Pollard's book. Even elementary
consistency is in short supply in connection with pivotal terms he uses. Thus he
states about chance not only that "it cannot be the cause or reason for anything
happening," but also that "chance and probability in modern physics are...real and
essential elements of the world which it describes." The last statement implies, of
course, the question of the value of scientific explanation. This crucial, philosophical problem is never met head-on by Pollard as if he had not heard of the
countless books written on the subject both prior to and after the advent of
quantum mechanics. Nor is the question, already aired in this paper, about the
legitimacy of inference from the operational to the ontological, so much as hinted
at by him.
As one living in the physicists' world, he should not be too severely judged. The
scientific community ignored countless warnings concerning that inference. if not
the very first, certainly the most concise of those warnings was carried to the four
corners of the scientific world through a letter that appeared in the December 29,
1930, issueof Nature, the leading scientific weekly. The concluding sentence of that
letter written by J. E. Turner, of the University of Liverpool, in connection with a
prominent physicist's popularization of the chance world of atoms, contained
more depth than much of the literature celebrating quantum mechanical chance,
"Every argument that since some change cannot be 'determined' in the absolutely
different sense of 'caused,' is a fallacy of equivocation." 77
Whether Pollard perceived something of the sadly inadequate character of his
reasoning on behalf of universal chance is a secondary matter. Nor is one to be
appalled by the fact that as a scientist he fell completely under the sway of the
extraordinary successes of quantum mechanical techniques and took them for
basic and ultimate explanation. The same happened to countless colleagues of his,
from the most outstanding to the most ordinary. What should seem to be
especially instructive within the perspective of this paper is that he failed to perceive
the devastating consequences devolving for Christian miracles from the very
method he offered as their only safeguard. For underlying that method there seems
to be a measure of respect for science as it actually is that may undermine science as
well as miracles (Providence) by the same stroke. Such undue measure of respect
lurks between the lines as he states about his stated purpose of showing the full
harmony of providence (Bible) and science (quantum mechanics). It is "to be
accomplished in such a way that the essential integrity and unity of science, both as
it is now and as in principle it may become, is fully preserved."
Undoubtedly a God who created human reason and is Reason himself deserves
in full that logike latreia which Saint Paul enjoined (Romans 12:1) on Christians
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and Pollard may have had in mind. Such worship is incompatible with the
slighting of anything that human reason can safely ascertain. By the same token
that same kind of worship assumes as verity that there can be no contradiction
between the historical revelation (be it in words or in deeds) of such God and His
self-revelation through nature which according to the same Saint Paul (Romans
1:20) is irrefutably clear, regardless of the resolve of some to ignore it. But the
non-existence of contradiction between revelation and reason can only be
established if careful attention is given to the possible sources of a misrepresentation of either or both. Contradictions are again bound to loom large if reason is
limited to science, and even more so if the science of the day is taken for Science in
its ultimate form. Neither science nor Revelation was served whenever God's basic
way of action was taken to be equivalent to the workings attributed by that science
to nature.
The story, several centuries old by now, is replayed with a new twist in Pollard's
book. The great success of mechanistic or Newtonian science was a powerful
motivation for casting God in the role of a clockmaker. But those theologians,
whom Voltaire merely echoed in celebrating such a God, 79 were not eager to
project him into the Bible. Pollard, however, is most emphatic in saying two things:
One is that the idea of a God who suspends now and then the workings of the
machinery of the world is "almost wholly unbiblical." The other is that only the
notion of a God continually casting dice (that is doing what the chance of quantum
mechanics is supposed to represent) is wholly and alone biblical. After taking issue
with those who speak disparagingly of "mere" chance, Pollard waxes dogmatic:
To Einstein's famous question expressing his abhorrence of quantum
mechanics, "Does God throw dicer the Judeo-Christian answer is
not, as so many have wrongly supposed, a denial, but a very positive
affirmative. For only in a world in which the laws of nature govern
events in accordance with the casting of dice can the Biblical view of a
world whose history is responsive to God's will prevail."
Before considering the allegedly biblical character of a dice-throwing God it
should be worth considering the dice in question. Nothing would be more
mistaken than to think of an ordinary die. The latter has six faces, eight corners,
twelve edges, all definite parameters with such others as specific weight, elasticity,
temperature, and so forth. Were God to be using such a die He would have to
throw it but once. Its first and all subsequent bouncings off from a specific ground
would strictly follow from the initial conditions of the first throw that could be
known to God with complete accuracy. Nor would the case be any different were
the various parameters of the die subject to statistical variations. What had already
been said about statistical gas theory would apply here too. There one would still
be within the framework of classical or deterministic physics. While we humans
can only start from an average value of the parameters, to God all the individual
cases of possible variations would be equally known and also their actual sequence
as fully determined by the initial conditions.
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Quite different would be the case of God throwing a quantum mechanical die.
The latter, radically different from the ordinary die, would display a random
variability in the actually existing number of its parameters such as faces, edges,
corners, etc. This has to be so as long as one does not disavow the very core of the
Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics, that is, the logical somersault
according to which an interaction that cannot be measured exactly cannot take
place exactly or rather can take place only with an ontological defect in it. Instead
of measurement one can, of course, refer to what it presupposes, the specification
of parameters needed to carry it out. The necessary incompleteness of those
specifications means, according to the Copenhagen philosophy, an ontological
incompleteness.
To supply that defect the Copenhagen camp or the overwhelming majority of
physicists invokes chance or, as will be seen shortly, their short-sighted wizardry
with mathematical operators. A theologian-physicist like Pollard, with equal
allegiance to both of his professions, will of course invoke God in addition to
chance. The result is that all events in the physical realm (where all events are
ultimately chance events according to the Copenhagen philosophy) become so
many direct events actually performed by God, who alone can supply all
parameters of the die which are (partly or entirely) unspecifiable by quantum
mechanics and therefore (partly or entirely) non-existent according to that
philosophy. If, however, such is the case, all natural events become miracles and all
miracles become strictly natural events.
To his credit, Pollard minces no words: "It is an error to think of a miracle as
being 'unnatural.' " (According to him only the moral significance attributed by
the faithful to very rare events turns them into miracles.) 8 ' To be sure, in another
passage he restricts that sweeping statement to the "majority of biblical miracles."
They "are the result of an extraordinary and extremely improbable combination of
chance and accidents. They do not, on close analysis, involve, as is so frequently
supposed, a violation of the law of nature." 82 He thinks that in such a way all
miraculous healings listed in the New Testament are accounted for. As for
large-scale nature-miracles, such as the one connected with the Exodus, they are
still but natural coincidences for him. His exegesis is, of course, a rehash of ideas of
liberal Protestant and modernist divines. He seems to follow them too as he
ascribes most biblical miracles to the hunger which "late elaborators" of those
stories had for the miraculous. 83 In fact he retains only three events as miracles: the
creation of all, the Incarnation and Christ's Resurrection.
But is there a logical way of saving the reality of these three miracles while
turning the Gospel account about many others into morality tales however
exalted? One wonders whether Dr. Pollard thought of the price paid by so many
liberal theologians for their being ashamed of miracles as so many violations of the
"sacred" laws of physics. Their fate is grippingly mirrored in the spiritual odyssey
of Leo Tolstoy who took them for a guide. With his genius of a writer he could
portray grippingly their starting point as well as their state in the end. The former is
succinctly given in the precept laid down in a notebook of his where the effort "to
reinforce the teachings of Christ with miracles" is declared to be equivalent to
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"holding a lighted candle in front of the sun in order to see better." The end is
illustrated by Tolstoy's harmony of the four gospels with so many passages cut out
from the originals as to make a major biographer of his speak of it as "the Gospel
according to St. Leo."'" Better known is Tolstoy's novel, Resurrection, in which
Christ's rising from the death is turned into a mere myth, shared, of course,
communally.
Almost a hundred years later the Anglican bishop of Durham, Dr. Jenkins,
served memorable evidence that the principle of demythologization inevitably
turns, in the hands of a consistent devotee to it, the Gospel account about Christ's
resurrection into a symbolic communal expression of hope in eternal life. Pollard's
caveat that the Resurrection of Christ is an individual event and therefore cannot
concern science, that is, quantum mechanics which deals with aggregates of events,
is wholly beside the point. Christ's bodily resurrection does not come under the
competence of quantum mechanics because it is a macroscopic event, though, in its
terms, it would still ultimately he a chance event for which Pollard should have
invoked God as the One who supplied ontologically, though "randomly," the
parameters that would not be specified by quantum mechanics. Nor is this the
place to deal with Pollard's view that the ultimate truth of miracles rests with the
faith of the community which endows a very rare event with a -religious significance. Here let it suffice to say that such a falling back on communal faith would
force the Christian to abandon the biblical injunction in terms of which he has to
render a fully reasoned account of his faith and comportment. The same tactic also
deprives him of the possibility of challenging on a rational ground others not
sharing his faith. They--agnostics, Jews, Muslims, Buddhists, Marxists, or
Voodooists—are given by that tactic the same right to rest their case ultimately on
their respective shared "faith." Clearly, what Pollard offers as a rational defense of
Christian miracles is in fact a fearsome boomerang depriving that defense of all
rationality. 85
The disservice which Pollard's explanation of miracles does to Christian faith
derives ultimately from a distortion of the biblical portrayal of God's relation to
the physical world created by Him. Of that relation Pollard mentions only God's
full sovereignty over nature and His most intimate involvement in all its events. He
is silent about another no less noticeable aspect of that relation, namely, the
constancy, endurance, stability, lawfulness and consistency of the universe and its
parts. As was already noted, the importance of that aspect is nowhere revealed
more powerfully than in passages in which God's faithfulness to his covenant with
David is supported with a reference to the faithfulness and stability with which the
physical world created by Him follows its course and endures.
That the biblical world view implies regularity and constancy was briefly
recognized by Donald M. MacKay, author of the other book to be considered
here." He did so, however, in a way that runs the risk of destroying the natural
knowability of those two cosmic qualities. The stability of the solid contents of the
world is, according to MacKay, declared in the Bible:
to he a dynamic, contingent, stability. It is only in and through the
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continuing say-so of their and our Creator that they cohere or "hold
together." He is the giver of being, moment by moment, to all the
events in and through which we encounter the world of physical
objects... But however uncompromisingly realist its tone, the Bible has
no room for the idea of matter as something eternally self-sufficient or
indestructible. The Psalmist may praise God for the stability of the
earth and the reliability of the normal links between events on which
our rational expectations are based, but the same Book of Psalms
speaks of a time when the earth and the heavens will perish and will be
changed "as a vesture" at the will of their Creator. In the end, for
biblical theism, the only solid reality is God and what God holds in
being.87
What this account leaves out of consideration is whether all those beings are
kept by God in existence from moment to moment or are created anew out of
nothing at every moment. MacKay's inveighing against what he calls the GrecoMedieval view of the cosmos consisting of "necessary natures" known by a priori
reasoning is part of that partial vision. 88 It suggests that he cannot or is not willing
to conceive of a "nature" which in itself is only one of the niany possibilities
available for God's creation but which by being a "nature" assures that it is
maintained by God in existence in conformity to it. MacKay's oversight of the
medieval philosophical and theological thinking (so critical of the Greeks on at
least three crucial points) as the spark of the rise of modern science 89 is a corollary
of his broader and distinctly Calvinist (Ockhaniist) perspective.
This should be no surprise. From the moment Calvin (or Ockham) rose against
apostolic succession, they rose against ecclesial or sacramental continuity across
time. To buttress philosophically their break with historic continuity they were
instinctively pushed toward a world view steeped in discontinuities, that is, toward
a Nature without "natures." No wonder MacKay is pushed by the logic of his own
position to asserting that continuity and objectivity in nature can only be known by
one's surrendering to biblical revelation, or rather to MacKay's reading of it. Thus
in discussing the lure of quantum theory, which challenges the distinction between
the observers and the observed, and the lure of relativity theory, which challenges
the validity of a single description of the world valid for all observers, MacKay
concludes: "True our Christian scientist in God's world may have no access to the
Creator's eye view of his situation; but because he knows that he is under judgment
by that criterion, he is saved from the trap of confusing relativity with a denial of
objectivity.""
It is the same condition of standing under the judgment of biblical revelation as
he interprets it that saves Mac Kay's believing scientist from the pitfalls of quantum
theory. This declaration of MacKay is all the more instructive because he does not
invoke revelation or biblical perspective as an indispensable ground for recognizing that Einstein's opponents "had no rational grounds for claiming that the
absence of an observable causal precedent for an event meant that it had no causal
precedent." 91 But no sooner had MacKay seemed to sight the ontological
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perspective of the problem, he lost sight of it, or perhaps he deliberately tried to
cover it up with a theological smokescreen which is, however, rather transparent.
For the question is not whether God can play dice in a manner worthy of Him. The
question is once more about the way in which the parameters or details that cannot
be specified by quantum mechanics become presently existing in order to let things
go. MacKay tries to resolve that question on the basis that God is most directly
involved in all events as a Sovereign Lord over all his creation. But in doing so he
merely sidesteps the problem which once more surfaces as he states: "From a
biblical standpoint it would be equally mistaken to argue that if there were no
causal precursor for an event, then its Creator must be thought of as 'playing
For the absence of a causal precursor, or even the partial absence of such
dice.'
a precursor, is an ontological gap. Does it fall upon MacKay's "biblical God" to fill
that gap with continual instantaneous creations? That such is indeed the thrust of
MacKay's reasoning may be surmised from his further talking around the problem
without being ready to meet it head on:
" 92

The God of biblical theism is beholden to none to account for his
creative agency. If he freely wills into being a succession of events in
which one half of the sub-microscopic details at any time are
unspecified by their precursors, this would involve no inconsistency
with his character, still less with his sovereignty, as portrayed in the
Bible. Belief in a sovereign God does not in the least entail a belief that
there must be "hidden physical variables" sufficient to determine the
beh-aviour of electrons on the basis of precedent. For biblical theism all
events, equally, with or without precursors according to precedent,
need God's say-so in order that they occur at all. The choice of "God or
Chance" is simply not a meaningful alternative, if "Chance" is meant in
the scientific sense. As the Book of Proverbs (ch. 16, v. 33) has it: "The
lots may be cast into the lap, but the issue depends wholly on the
Lord."93
Whatever the appropriateness of that particular biblical passage, MacKay's
banking on God's sovereignty seems to be very inappropriate. The issue is not that
God is sovereign but whether He is at least as rational as human beings are. The
latter can clearly recognize the difference between being and non-being. It is that
difference which is the real issue concerning the theory of hidden variables.
Whether most professional supporters and opponents of that theory have realized
this is irrelevant. As was already stated, physicists have for centuries been apt to
limit their vistas to quantitatively exact measurements and this is why they have
taken it for mechanical (and implicitly for ontological) causality. Insofar as hidden
variables have an ontological relevance, the biblical God, whose self-revealed
name I AM WHO I AM is ontology incarnate, 94 is bound to provide them in one
way or another. MacKay seems to suggest that He does so by continually creating
out of nothing at least one half of the ontological specifications of all atoms to fill
the ontological gaps created by quantum mechanics or rather by its Copenhagen
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pseudo-philosophy.
In a manner characteristic of the entire Ockhamist tradition that heavily
conditioned the Reformers' theologizing (for all their dislike for philosophy),
MacKay goes straight to God's sovereignty as if this could dispose of a plain
question whether the existence or non-existence of certain things is meant by some
staple phrases of quantum mechanics. No wonder that he sees but the veneer of the
fallacy of setting up Chance as a kind of anti-deity standing for chaos and absence
of meaning. 95 He fails to see that the basic issue about chance is whether it can be a
substitute for reality, be it the reality of physical parameters that "do not exist"
because quantum mechanics cannot specify them. Understandably, MacKay did
his utmost to make it appear that his train of thought did not force him to charge
God with the task of supplying the reality of those unspecified parameters with
special creative acts performed every split second. His fellow scientists would have
been taken aback, though not for the right reason. The latter, not a matter of
theology but of plain philosophy, could not, however, be seen by the ones who had
bartered sound reasoning about reality for the hollow glitter of mathematical
operators which give no certainty about anything real, let alone about miracles and
Providence in human history.
PERENNIAL PERSPECTIVES
Certainty about real events or things, usual or unusual, can never begin with
science, and not even with "the Lord's quantum mechanics" 96 as Schrodinger once
spoke in quasi-mystical awe of his own specialty. Science rather presupposes real
things in order to ascertain their quantitative properties; it cannot provide any of
those uncountable things. Of course, nothing reveals so forcefully the reality of
things as their limitedness which has many quantitative components. But whether
they, or the things in which they are embedded, do exist or not is not a scientific
question. Being a question about the real, it cannot be answered except by a
philosophy which provides the perennially proper place for the question. To be
sure, even idealist philosophies make claim to reality, to say nothing of the
philosophies known as rationalism, empiricism, sensationism and pragmatism.
They all claim to be the place for the real. But not the proper or primary place.
They are indeed betrayed by their labels, which are almost always the choice of
their chief articulators. Those labels invariably relate to an aspect of the real insofar
as it can be conceptualized, sensed, tested, manipulated and so forth.
None of those philosophies would carry their special labels if the very start of
their program and method would be an unconditional acknowledgment of
external reality. Only that acknowledgment is a guarantee of its being known with
certainty. This may appear a kind of plain arguing in a circle. Actually, it is the only
starting point which can save one from arguing ever in such a way. It is a
consciously and methodically-taken starting point. A chief recommendation of
that method is that all other philosophical approaches to knowing the real with
certainty have turned out to be so many seeds of doubt about reality or means
whereby the thinking man found himself cut off from the external world. Cartesian

Miracles and Physics

27

rationalism that aimed at complete certainty (equating it with mathematics which
is a series of tautologies, however useful) led to Spinoza's perplexity about any and
all finite real things. 97 Francis Bacon's empiricist "instauration" of a new age in
thinking revealed in Hume's hands the fragmentation through it of all judgment
about reality. Kant's effort to restore certitude through the a priori character of
mental categories led in Fichte's hands to the exaltation of the will and, in Hegel's
hands, to the divinization of the individual ego, the least reliable commodity one
can think of. The sensationism advocated by Mach locked him in solipsism which
is undoubtedly the highest conceivable measure of certainty although not
communicable. As to pragmatism, its chief spokesmen, William James and John
Dewey, would in vain try today to disavow the uncertainty which it has generated
about everything except, of course, one's selfish and all too often very transient
success.
The other chief recommendation for taking the certainty of knowing external
reality for the starting point in all philosophy is that any refutation of it implies
knowledge of that type. Thus to argue that a specific registering of a fact, thing, or
event was a mere hallucination, one must assume that it is possible not to be under
its influence in registering this or that fact. The same holds true about the argument
based on any partial deception or error of one's senses or on any exaggerated claim
about the extent of one's observations. Those "critical" philosophers who have
succeeded in spreading the belief that nothing can be known unless first critically
proven have in fact assumed this very knowledge without first critically proving it.
Moreover, just as colors cannot be discoursed upon in terms of non-colors, the
knowledge of external reality cannot be proven in terms of knowing only one's
mind, "critical" or not. 98
This is basically all that is needed to show the certainty of facts called miracles.
The all in question may sound very little, but actually it is co-extensive with that
largest entity called the world of the real, and also co-extensive with all reasoned
discourse relating to it. In a sense that all is very restricted as it is ultimately reduced
to the evidence of one's unaided senses. This may appear ridiculously little in an
age of science that probes such realms of the very small and the very large that are
inconceivably beyond the reach of the senses. It should not, however, be forgotten
that the ultimate certainty of all the esoteric findings of science in the farthest
reaches of space and in the deepest layers of matter rests on the reliability of the
senses that register the position of ordinary pointer needles. This is what no less an
"idealist" physicist than Eddington recognized when he stated that "molar physics
has the last word in observation for the observer is molar." 99 And if the physicist
takes no stock of this, he can embroil himself in the kind of embarassment which
left speechless for a moment the famed astronomer-cosmologist W. H. McCrea.
After being heard to state in a lecture that the star images seen through the
telescopes have a strict relation to reality only insofar as they are sensations on the
retina, he was asked in the question-answer period: "Would you also hold the same
about the reality of the wall which you are facing?" His answer, "I am not really
sure," speaks for itself. 10° Not even that much comment is deserved by the
inconsistency of those astronomers (some world-famous) who after boasting of
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their solipsism during dinner, 101 do not blush as they spend the night looking
through their telescopes.
Immediate direct observation of things and the certainty of that observation (or
at least the certainty with which it can be corrected or improved) is the rock bottom
basis not only of philosophy but of science as well. In view of this and of what
already has been said about the true status of scientific laws, it should not be
difficult to perceive the disingenuousness of the indignation with which miracles
are denounced as violations of the laws of nature. The indignation is essentially a
clever form of the strategy: attack is the best defense. But if it is impossible to start a
march (physical or mental) with the second step, concern about the laws of nature
should give second place to concern about man's ability to register things and
events with certainty. And since without that ability nothing can be known about
the laws of nature, the chief intellectual concern should be not so much about the
possible violations of the laws of nature as about the actual violation, if not plain
rape, of man's mind whose natural function is to know reality with immediate
certitude.
Such a rape is committed when individuals reporting extraordinary events, and
in fact lay down their lives on behalf of their witness, are declared at the outset to be
hotheaded enthusiasts, uncritical minds, or plain fakers. This is done on the
patently dogmatic ground that nature cannot change its course. Those taking that
ground rape their own intellect to the point of declaring that they cannot even have
one. A startling admission of this came from such a prominent spokesman of the
absolute unchangeability of "nature's laws" (a form of sheer materialism) as J. B. S.
Haldane:
If my mental processes are determined wholly by the motions of atoms
in my brain, I have no reason to suppose that my beliefs are true. They
may be sound chemically, but that does not make them sound
logically. And hence I have no reason for supposing my brain to be
composed of atoms. 102
The defense of miracles done with an eye on physics should include a passing
reference to meteorites. Characteristic of the stubborn resistance of scientific
academies to those strange bits of matter was Laplace's shouting, "We've had
enough such myths," when Pictet, a fellow academician, urged a reconsideration
of the evidence provided by "lay-people" as plain eyewitnesses./ 03 Laymen were
they in the sense that they had no telescopes, no training in celestial mechanics, no
knowledge of trajectories, azimuth, right and left ascension. But they could
register with absolute certainty that a fiery body had just hit the ground nearby
and could unerringly distinguish its still warm stony remains as something not
belonging to the soil around it. That such a kind of witnessing stands in its own
right was the point recognized by a doctor on being confronted with the objection
of a colleague who insisted that the wide-open fracture below the left knee of Pieter
De Rudder (1822-1898), the subject of possibly the most startling cure related to
Lourdes, could not be accepted for a fact because the two ends of the broken bone
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protruding through the skin had not been certified by a medical commission. The
reply of that rightly indignant physician, "it does not take a tailor to see that a coat
is full of holes,"/ 04 contains an instructiveness that is practically inexhaustible.
The case of sighting meteorites, however extraordinary, is not the same as the
case of miracles. Unlike meteorites that repeat themselves, any given miracle is a
strictly individual event that cannot be expected to occur again. Again, unlike the
fall of a meteorite, always a purely physical event, a miracle is also a historical
event, however physical it may be. Its verification, even in the case of a fresh
miracle, is essentially one involving the historical method with its reliance on direct
witnesses, on indirect observation, and circumstantial evidence. This is why
ancient miracles as objects of historical verification are a much more difficult
matter than are recent miracles. Only upon the latter does beat "the bright light of
modern history," to recall a felicitous expression of that famed Jewish novelist
Franz Werfel in his introduction to The Song of Bernadette, his memorable
reconstruction of what happened at Lourdes. 105
For all his certainty about the miracles of Lourdes, and for all his gratitude to
the Lady of its Grotto and to the memory of her humble maidservant Bernadette
Soubirous (whose body he knew to lie incorrupt in a glass casket in Nevers), Werfel
did not become a Christian, a Catholic. As to Alexis Carrell, who received in 1912
the Nobel Prize for his study of the rate at which wounds heal, he first went in 1903
to Lourdes, 106 where incredibly fast healing of festering wounds had by then been
attested for almost half a century. Yet, it was not until 1940 or so that Carrell was
able to get rid of all his agnostic reservations and become a Christian, a Catholic,
although long before that he had known of the powerful argument that reason
could forge from an attentive consideration of those cures. The argument had
already been voiced on more than one occasion when in 1909 Teilhard de Chardin
cast it into a classic form with his powerful prose:
If a common antecedent for the cures could only be discovered; if we
could extract from all these authentic facts something which marks
them off or conditions them! But we find only this: Lourdes; and it is
not the Lourdes imagined or hoped for in the excitement of pilgrimages...but it is Lourdes alone—Lourdes, a naked and objective reality,
to which is attached a mysterious virtue, independent of anything the
sick and the praying crowds can take there.
If the cures of Lourdes were characterized by any family likeness,
attached to one category of diseases or appeared under determinate
circumstances of time or place, I might invoke with show of reason,
some magnetism, some appropriate vibration with which the human
body would enter into a vivifying resonance. The precise cause would
escape me, but a certain regularity in the phenomena would assure me
of the existence of this cause and entitle me to imagine it. But there is
nothing of the kind...effects follow each other without apparent rule.
These cures are distributed as if by chance, and sometimes there are
alarming relapses. In all truth, what renders Lourdes altogether extra-
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medical is less what occurs there than the manner in which the
prodigies take place. If what happens there astonishes the scientists,
the way it happens is absolutely beyond him. 107

The purpose of this paper was to call attention to the role which the recognition
of "naked and objective reality" (or of plain facts) plays in the philosophy that
alone can do justice to facts be they so extraordinary as to be called miracles. The
chief recommendation of that philosophy is that it alone can cope also with the
facts of ordinary life as well as with the facts which science carefully isolates for its
purposes. For even in the systematic isolation or carefully controlled conditions
which science demands for its facts, their usefulness ultimately depends on the
reliability of plain human witness about them. Without that witness not only the
vast enterprise known as scientific endeavor would lose its claim to truth, but also
the far more vast social life would be deprived of right to justice. Courts of all
levels, governments of all jurisdiction, depend on witnesses and their plain
witnessing" and so do laboratories. In none of those forums can a discrimination
against plain witnessing of unusual facts be condoned or else the most important
cases may be prejudged and the only avenues for progress be blocked. Had Oersted
refused to believe his eyes when they noted that the magnetic needle which he
placed under a live wire turned in a direction which he believed to be impossible,
the discoveries of Faraday and Maxwell might not have followed as they did. The
discovery of the world of atoms depended on Roentgen's chance witnessing the
formation,. that was not expected to happen, of the negative image of a key on a
photographic plate. Far more importantly, would Newtonian science have
developed at all if Kepler had not unconditionally trusted Tycho Brahe's eyes in
making countless naked-eye observations about the positions of the planet Mars?
Luckily for science, it witnesses relatively rarely the brushing aside of a report
about a really new case with the remark: "It cannot be really different from the
thousand other cases we have already investigated." The brave reply of the young
assistant, "But, Sir, what if this is the thousand and first case?" which after more
than half a century is still whispered in the corridors of psychoanalysis,I 09 is
precisely the rejoinder which is to be faced in connection with facts that fall under
suspicion because of their miraculous character.
The witnessing of facts is, of course, to be coupled with a willingness to face up to
the consequences of the fact witnessed. If the author of the Book of Joshua did not
mean an extremely dark cloud cover in speaking about the stopping of the sun "in
the middle of the sky" and staying there "for a whole day" (Joshua 10:13), 11) then
one has on hand astronomical consequences that even from a distance of three
thousand years could be verified. No other biblical miracle would pose a similar
problem. Such physical miracles as the multiplication of the bread, the changing of
water into wine, Christ's and Peter's walking on the water, represent disturbances
that cannot be detected from a distance of two thousand years. This would be the
case even if they were to be contemporary events. The reason for this is not so
much the relative minuteness of the physical effect they represent, but the
impossibility of making the scientific apparatus ready for the event. This is not to
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say that there would not be countless men of science ready to stand by with all sorts
of sensors to register the physical parameters of a physical miracle, including the
rapid healing of festering wounds, of broken bones, of collapsed lungs, and of
lumps of cancerous tissues. But those men of science would in vain wait for an
invitation from on High or from any of the Almighty's saintly agents. Miracles are
not for order. They never were.
This is the only point about miracles which puts the believer at a disadvantage.
Humiliating it may be, but a humiliation fully consistent with the humble
framework in which the two Covenants were offered to man across the span of
over a dozen centuries. An insignificant corner of the earth was chosen to be the
scene of both Covenants. The chosen recipient was a people that should seem most
insignificant compared with the cultural, artistic, and organizational magnificence
of great neighboring civilizations. There is, of course, a silver lining inside that
humiliation, a silver lining which is nothing short of a miracle: a unique
interpretation of history, human and cosmic, physical and moral, compared with
which all other interpretations, ancient or recent, are a poor second. That
ultimately the rise of science was sparked by that interpretation' is hardly a point
to let drift from focus in the often theatrical confrontation of miracles with science.
No humiliation is involved in the fact that miracles are never automatically
overwhelming proofs. They represent the challenge of external reality, not of
axioms of logic." 2 That true miracles are never coercive, whatever their occasional
impact on skeptics and scoffers, is their chief recommendation. A dispensation
would never be truly divine that would take man's freedom away because such a
dispensation would not also be fully human. Clearly, it all depends on the
perspective or, to use the technical term, philosophy or epistemology. That all, not
only miracles but everything else, depends on it is implied in the recognition that, to
borrow a forceful phrase from a famed analysis of the origins of modern science,
"the only way to avoid becoming a metaphysician is to say nothing."' " What the
author actually meant was the very opposite of the meaning which is usually
ascribed to metaphysics: the art of bartering facts for ideas. Unfortunately, the
author in question did not know of the only metaphysics, Aristotelian-Thomistic
metaphysics, that begins with the recognition of facts and claims in fact that all the
rules (categories) of man's mental operations are a distillation from his registering
of facts." 4
To approach any subject, be it the subject of miracles, in any other way will land
the mind in mirages as witnessed by the despair of modern man about his intellect.
That man will find help only from those Christians who have not lost sight, even
for a moment, of the truly realistic epistemology. Such Christians and only such
can fully seize their intellectual opportunity which is offered by those unbelievers
who at least admit the fact of certain extraordinary events, though not their
miraculous character. They are at one with T. H. Huxley who urged that
unreserved attention be given to all facts, however extraordinary. They would
emulate also that Huxley who, following the death of his first son at the age of
seven, firmly declined the comfort of Christian perspectives. Huxley did so with a
profession of faith in the facts of nature as seen by science as he understood it:
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Science seems to me to teach in the highest and strongest manner the
great truth which is embodied in the Christian conception of entire
surrender to the will of God. Sit down before fact as a little child,
prepared to give up every preconceived notion, follow humbly
wherever and to whatever abysses nature leads, or you shall learn
nothing. I have only begun to learn content and peace of mind since I
have resolved at all risks to do this. " 5

The defender of Christian miracles should, of course, be able to demythologize
that notion of science which Huxley in the same context made an object of worship
with his eyes fixed on the inverse square law, in obvious ignorance of its not
entirely "scientific" provenance:
It is no use to talk to me of analogies and probabilities. I know what I
mean when I say I believe in the law of the inverse squares, and I will
not rest my life and my hopes upon weaker convictions. I dare not if I
would." 6
But even with that demythologization of science done, the Christian defender of
miracles must tirelessly return to them insofar as they are facts, and insist that they
be faced with the openness of a child. He can do no more than that teenage peasant
girl, Bernadette Soubirous, whose mental aplomb under endless questioning was
no less a miracle than the cures her visions had triggered. To a visitor pressing her
with doubts about those visions, she gave this reply of astonishing balance: "Je suis
chargee de vous le dire, je ne suis pas chargee de vous le faire croire." 117 This is all a
Christian can do about miracles. He has to reassert them as facts in all their details
and context but he should under no circumstances confuse the skillful and honest
presentation of facts with the art of convincing. About miracles, however factual,
conviction is a matter of God's grace which, however, has an intimate tie to facts,
however miraculous, that can be heard, seen and touched. It is these very terms
that are the object of a perception which is as sensory as it is an understanding or
episteme. A biblical proof of this is the very start of the first epistle of John, a
casting of the entire Christian message into a realist epistemological frame:
This is what we proclaim to you:
what was from the beginning,
what we have heard,
what we have looked upon,
and our hands have touched—
we speak of the word of life." 8 (Italics added)
Clearly, this kind of epistemology stands somewhere in the middle between the
classic extremes of positivism and idealism. In positivism, the tangible facts can
never lead to metaphysical heights, let alone to heights where the Word of Life is
heard. In idealism, the metaphysical heights are not supposed to be rooted in that
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reality which human touch and sight alone give access to. Only when imbued with
a median epistemology will Christians be liberated from a veneer of sophistication
about miracles which is but a throwback to a leery Humean scepticism. Only then
will they instinctively avoid either ending or beginning their discussion of miracles
with the despondent sigh, a transparent admission of an intellectual failure of the
nerve: "Miracle was once the foundation of all apologetics, then it became an
apologetic crutch, and today it is not infrequently regarded as a cross for
apologetics to bear."" 19 Only when Christians will relearn to glory in their minds as
an organ whose natural function is to have certainty about facts and things, will
they be able to derive intellectual glory from miracles. On that certainty and on it
alone can that intellectual platform be built which provides proper perspective
about science, about miracles, and even about God insofar as He can be grasped by
that reason which makes man a being created in His very image.
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